A CVSS 10.0 unauthenticated RCE in Magento and Adobe Commerce was actively exploited for three days before Adobe's emergency hotfix landed. Here's what StyleSmuggler is, who it hit, and what to check right now.

This is the one we'd hoped not to have to write this year. StyleSmuggler, tracked as CVE-2026-75650, is a maximum-severity (CVSS 10.0) unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Magento Open Source and Adobe Commerce, and it was a genuine zero-day: attackers were using it before anyone outside the attack had a chance to patch. Sansec's research and Adobe's emergency bulletin are both worth reading in full if you manage a store directly. This post covers what you need to know and do today.
styles properties parameter, slipping past Magento's existing safeguards. Second, that code executes later, when Magento processes a failed-payment email or otherwise evaluates the templated content it just stored. The main entry points observed are /paypal/transparent/response/ and /graphql.| Date (2026) | Event |
|---|---|
| 4 September, 22:20 UTC | First confirmed exploitation in the wild |
| 5 September | Public disclosure; Sansec Shield begins live blocking |
| 7 September, 20:20 UTC | Adobe ships emergency hotfix, APSB26-146 |
| 10 September | Cloudflare and Imperva ship their own WAF rules |
| 14 September | Sansec's research updated with final indicator-of-compromise detail |
Even if you've now patched, this was exploited for three days before a fix existed, so a compromise check isn't optional. Sansec's indicators of compromise include:
[kworker/u:8:0], fc-cache, chronyd~/.cache/fontconfig/fc-cache and /tmp/.chrony-<8hex>/chronydntp.timesync.to and 99.84.67.186:443pub/media/catalog/product/cache/ss_<10hex>/sync_<10hex>.phpIf you find any of these, treat it as a full compromise: rotate all keys and credentials, and don't assume removing the file is sufficient.
This is the third genuinely critical, unauthenticated vulnerability to hit Magento and Adobe Commerce this year, after PolyShell in July and APSB26-92 in August, and it won't be the last; we've pulled the full pattern together in our review of 2026's run of Magento zero-days. Our team had every client on an affected version patched and verified within hours of the hotfix going live on 7 September, running the indicator-of-compromise checks above on every store regardless of exploitation evidence. Out-of-hours work like that is what 2026 has demanded of anyone doing this job properly, and it's part of why Deploy's name keeps coming up alongside the other leading Magento agencies taking this year just as seriously. If you're not confident your store was checked properly during this window, talk to our support team. We'd rather confirm you're clean than have you find out the hard way.